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SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW 
A significant recent development in the field of legal science in 
this country, the importance of which is not yet generally recog-
nized by laymen, is the noteworthy awakening of interest in the 
philosophical literature of the continent of Europe dealing with 
legal institutions. Progress in this field of legal philosophy has 
been especially rapid since the late seventies, particularly in 
Germany. In English-speaking countries no phenomena of 
equal significance have occurred. America has never produced 
any notable philosophical jurists; and the work of English legal 
scholars of the past generation, though in some instances it has 
been brilliant and of far-reaching value, has been mainly historical 
or critical in tendency. The opportunities for American lawyers 
to familiarize themselves with the product of continental in-
vestigations, either through translations or through descriptive 
accounts, have been few and far between. Hastie's translations 
from the works of Puchta, Friedlander, Falck, and Ahrens, 
published at Edinburgh as far back as 1887, formed, until very 
recently, almost the only serviceable work of the kind in exist-
ence, and the doctrines incorporated in it are now regarded as 
old-fashioned. 
It would be invidious to attempt to name all the leaders in 
the new movement now happily launched, but it is only proper 
to say that to no one is more of the credit due for the new impetus 
given to the study of continental legal philosophy than to Pro-
fessor Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School and to Dean 
John H. Wigmore of the law school of North-Western Univer-
sity. The brilliant work of Professor Pound deserves more than 
a passing glance. His ripe scholarship and remarkable grasp 
of abstruse problems entitle him to rank as one of our foremost 
American jurists, and it is probably safe to say that this country, 
up to the present time, has produced no profounder thinker or 
keener analyst than he in the field of the law. Professor Pound 
during the past five years has produced a group of deeply signifi-
cant essays on the new jurisprudence. He is about to publish 
a book on Sociological Jurisprudence which will contain the 
substance of a large number of papers published in technical 
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journals. The importance of this work cannot be overestimated. 
It will doubtless long remain the keenest critical exposition of 
the various schools of European legal philosophy written in the 
English language. 
While Professor Wigmore has not written extensively on the 
subject, he has contributed quite as much to the movement by 
the momentum of his personality as he could have by producing 
books. He is considered, not only one of our greatest legal 
scholars, but also, in linguistic and scientific attainments, one of 
the most brilliant minds in his profession, most deeply versed in 
the lore of recondite European writers. Thus he has inspired 
others to do what he has not time, though ample equipment, to 
do for himself; and the legal scholarship of the future will be 
heavily indebted to him for his work as chairman and leading 
spirit of committees in charge of the publication of works of the 
utmost importance. There is more than one series of such publi-
cations now under way, but that which has most direct bearing 
on the matter in hand is the Modern Legal Philosophy Series. 
Six volumes of this series have already appeared, containing 
translations of important works by Gareis, Berolzheimer. 
Miraglia, Korkunov, Ihering, and Kohler. Seven volumes more 
are to appear under the auspices of the Association of American 
Law Schools, presenting to American readers the doctrines of 
French, German, and Italian jurists. 
This splendid undertaking will make the writings of the lead-
ing Continental jurists common property. Already their con-
tributions to the theory of law have begun to be discussed in the 
learned journals, and it will not be long before courses will be 
established in the curricula of our law schools which will instruct 
students in the newer phases of theoretical jurisprudence. The 
interest thus awakened, however, will not be confined to law 
students, but will be shared by students of political and social 
science, and by publicists and economists as well. Eventually 
the laity in general, because it must try to keep pace with the 
advancement of science, will find some knowledge of the theory 
of legal institutions essential to a sound and complete education. 
Long before that, the influence of the altered conception of the 
purpose and meaning of law may be expected to show itself in 
judicial decisions and in the attitude of those charged with the 
making and enforcement of the laws. 
The movement, therefore, has significance for laymen as well 
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as for lawyers. As an illustration of the growing recognition of 
some need of an acquaintance with foreign legal literature, on 
the part not only of the lawyer but of the legislator, it is enough 
to refer to the Guides to the Law and Legal Literature of foreign 
countries issued by the Congressional Library. 
The sociological theory of law is probably more easily ex-
pressible in terms which the layman may comprehend than the 
doctrines handed down from one generation to another of prac-
tising lawyers from the time of Blackstone. The philosophical 
varieties of the sociological theory are very diverse. It would be 
impossible to single out anyone writer as typical of the whole 
movement, for the movement is constantly progressing and 
exhibiting new phases, and a standard type can be attained only 
at some future day, when the tributaries of current discussion 
have flowed into a common stream and a process of fusion has 
taken place. At the same time the sociological school is sharply 
differentiated from the schools that have preceded it. In no 
respect is this difference more marked than in the refusal to 
segregate legal science from the other social sciences and to treat 
it as an independent subject in no way connected with other 
departments of knowledge. 
"The unity of the social sciences and the impossibility of a self-centred, 
-self-sufficing science of law are now insisted upon by sociological jurists," 
writes Professor Pound. "It has been felt for some time that the entire 
-separation of jurisprudence from the other social sciences, the leaving of it to 
itself on the one hand and the conviction of its self-sufficiency on the other 
hand, was not merely unfortunate for the science of law on general considera-
tions, in that it necessitated a narrow and partial view, but was in large part 
to be charged with the backwardness of the law in meeting social ends, the 
tardiness of lawyers in admitting or even perceiving such ends, and the gulf 
between legal and popular thought on matters of social reform. Not a little 
of the world-wide discontent with our present legal order is due to modes of 
juristic thought and juridical method which result from want of 'team work' 
between jurisprudence and the other social sciences." 
First of all, then, it may be said that sociological jurisprudence 
refuses to isolate the law from life in general and that it treats 
the law not as an inflexible formula, to be expounded only by 
accomplished technicians, but as a flexible social institution, to 
be treated, like all other institutions, with regard to the utility 
of the end served and the nature of the function it seeks to fulfil. 
The law thus comes to be dealt with as something relative and 
flexible, rather than fixed and absolute. 
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It is this recognition of the flexibility of the law and of its 
constant readjustments to meet new social demands, which is 
likely to have the most far-reaching effect in this country. The 
earlier schools, to be sure, have in one degree or another recognized 
the law to be a flexible institution. They have, however, been 
content merely to point out that fact without investing it with 
any deep practical significance. With the sociological jurist 
the readjustment of the law to meet new social demands is not 
simply an actual tendency but a moral necessity. Only through 
such adjustment can the law attain its highest efficiency. As the 
law has its roots in the needs and interests of the human race, it 
becomes the duty of the lawyer and legislator to serve those 
needs and protect those interests to the best of his ability, and 
he is thus brought directly face to face with life itself. Conse-
quently, the immediate result of the new attitude will be an 
altered interpretation of current problems of social and economic 
legislation, and there must inevitably be a reaction against the 
time-worn precedents of the common law and a deliberate attempt 
to substitute new rules for old. This means that many of the 
highly individualistic conceptions which survive in the common 
law and are really anachronistic, being derived from doctrines 
long since abandoned, must yield to a modern ideal of social 
justice. As Professor Pound wrote five years ago in his article 
on 44 The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence" : 
"The idea has been, so far as possible, to allow every one to do and to 
acquire all that he can. The individualist conception of justice as the liberty 
of each limited only by the like liberties of all has been the legal conception. 
So completely has this been true that sociologists speak of this conception as 
'legal justice,' and it is sometimes assumed that law must needs aim at a 
different kind of justice from what is commonly understood and regarded by 
the community. But this cannot be. Law is a means, not an end." 
Mr. Edwin ~/r. Borchard of the State Department, formerly 
Law Librarian of Congress, has not claimed too much for the 
new sociological jurisprudence in the emphasis which he lays on 
the importance of a sound legal philosophy to the United States. 
We need, he says, a virile philosophy of law which is more efficient 
than the common law has been up to the present time in re-
sponding to the needs of present life. We need to apply those 
methods which in Germany "have helped to make law an 
effective handmaid in the development of social and political 
science." We need a philosophy, he says, which will correct the 
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errors of prevailing judicial doctrines regarding class legislation: 
the assumption of risk and contributory negligence, the right to 
pursue a lawful calling, and liberty of contract. 
To say, however, that the new method treats the law as a 
social institution to be regarded as a flexible means of realizing 
broad human objects which fall quite as much within the province 
of the sociologist as of the lawyer, is to name only one of many 
attributes of the new jurisprudence. What has been said would 
be a true characterization of the earlier stage of the movement, 
leaving its later development unnoticed. Thus Ihering, who 
has exerted vast influence on the new school, expounded a clear 
definition of the law as a system of the protected interests of 
individual members of society, and constructed a utilitarian, 
teleological theory which duly emphasized the subordination of 
the law to the general subject-matter of social science. Ihering, 
however, is now looked upon as a precursor rather than an ex-
ponent of the present movement. He has approached the problem 
of law from a utilitarian standpoint and has been called "the 
German Bentham." But the modern quality that differentiates 
him from the English Utilitarianism of a century ago is found in 
his ripe historical spirit and his assimilation of the biological 
tendencies of nineteenth-century positivism. Later writers in 
France, Germany, and Italy have developed a profounder 
analysis of the sociological foundations of law and likewise of 
its abstract rational foundations. Theoretical jurists are now 
directing their attention not simply to the scientific study of the 
law as an instrument of social justice, but are going straight to 
the heart of the problem of a science of social justice itself. They 
are coming to discuss seriously what one writer, Charmont, calls 
the" renascence of natural law, " as if it were an accomplished 
fact and not a mere tentative proposal. This contemporary 
natural ~aw speculation is entirely different from the old natural 
law speculation in that it has been influenced by sociological 
investigation and inclines to be for the most part, if not wholly, 
anti-metaphysical in tendency. It may be said, therefore, that 
the sociological method, using the term in a broad sense to apply 
to a varied group of impulses typical of the twentieth century, 
not only unifies the science of law with the science of society in 
general, but also seeks the solution of the problem of defining legal 
justice. It would take up too much space to attempt here to 
give an account of what sociological jurisprudence is, but under-
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lying the differences of contemporary doctrine there is an essen-
tial unity of aim with respect to leading issues, whether the 
problem of legal justice is approached from the analytical or 
ideological side, as by the neo-Kantians in Germany, or from the 
side of concrete reality, as by the neo-Hegelians (notwithstanding 
the misleading connotation of their name), who lay great stress 
on the value of historical and economic methods of investigation. 
Sociological jurisprudence, as Professor Pound says, is still 
formative, and "in diversity of view the sociological jurists but 
reflect the differences that exist among sociologists." He also· 
indicates that just as all the methods heretofore employed by 
sociology are undergoing unification, no single one being any 
longer regarded as self-sufficient, so none of the directions which 
sociological jurisprudence has taken up to the present time is to 
be pursued exclusively and undeviatingly. It goes without say-
ing that future progress in the science of sociology will promptly 
be reflected in the sociological theory of law. Americans have 
already accomplished so much in the field of sociology that we 
may confidently expect that our country will have its share in 
future notable contributions to this movement. 
ARTHUR W. SPENCER. 
Brookline, Mass. 
